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The right to be forgotten is a subject of contention in both the United States and 
the European Union. In the E.U., the right to be forgotten gives one the right to 
demand that information—even if published legitimately—be taken down or 
removed from search engine results. While well-intentioned, this has led to 
concerns of free press restrictions. In contrast, the right to be forgotten is not 
recognized in the U.S., although there are scholars who would like to see such a 
right here. This Note takes the view that introducing a right to be forgotten 
would be contrary to the first amendment and privacy law frameworks in the 
U.S., and further is not desirable based on the European experiment.  
In 2019 the European Court of Justice held in Google v. CNIL that a 
multinational platform does not have to comply with E.U. regulations on the 
right to be forgotten on its non-European platforms. Building on this distinction, 
this Note suggests an “offshore solution” to host articles and search engines 
outside the reach of European jurisdictions.  
This Note is of interest to scholars and practitioners curious about the right to 
be forgotten debates, as well as the general differences in jurisprudence 
between the U.S. and the E.U. in balancing privacy rights against freedom of 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. A Fishy Story 
A fish knife isn’t a particularly fancy knife. All that is needed is a 
sharp blade made from good steel, and a good fit and grip for slippery, 
slimy fish.1 The distinctive design is a long, thin knife, often with a wooden 
handle.2 It was developed when a designer noticed that the best knives used 
by fish processors were those knives that were worn down.3 A seafood 
restaurant on the Adriatic coast of Italy would logically have fish knives on 
hand for use in deboning fish. Such use would normally include fileting 
fish, not stabbing a human being. 
This particular seafood restaurant was owned by two brothers. A fight 
over money escalated into a stabbing. One brother stabbed the other with 
what he had on hand: the humble fish knife.4 This is what is called in the 
news industry a “man bites dog” story. “Restaurateur filets fish” is what is 
supposed to happen. There is no newsworthy story there. “Restaurateur 
stabs brother with fish knife” is news: it is not something that happens 
every day. The news organization that first picked it up was a local news 
website which focused on local colorful stories and government 
corruption.5 
This story is more interesting for what happened afterwards, in the 
courts of law. There are far-reaching ramifications from this and similar 
stories for a free and vibrant press in the European Union. The brothers, 
who apparently reconciled and did not press charges, were upset that a 
Google search of them produced the story of the fish-knife stabbing which 
was harming the reputation of the restaurant.6 They turned to the courts to 
demand that the article be taken down under the “right to be forgotten.”7 
The court agreed with them, ruling that two years was enough time for the 
story to become outdated news, and that the article had to be taken down.8 
The court also awarded damages of 10,000 Euros.9 The publisher did not 
 
* The author would like to thank Professor Peter DiCola and Donna Etemadi for their 
feedback on earlier drafts, Joy Kerr for translation assistance, and SK for putting up with 
him through law school. 
 1. Mike Toth, The Knife That’s Fed Millions (and Me), ANGLERS J. (May 22, 2019), 
https://www.anglersjournal.com/.amp/people/the-knife-thats-fed-millions-and-me. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id.  
 4 Adam Satariano & Emma Bubola, One Brother Stabbed the Other. The Journalist 
Who Wrote About It Paid a Price., N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2019), https://www. 
nytimes.com/2019/09/23/technology/right-to-be-forgotten-law-europe.html. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. 
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have the money, and eventually had to relinquish his scooter to the wielder 
of the fish knife.10 The local news organization eventually shut down.11 It 
was simply too hard for the publisher to keep track of all the requests to 
delete information. 
This story should serve as a cautionary tale of the excesses of the right 
to be forgotten in the European Union. The direct impact of being forced to 
take down newsworthy stories is the demonstrable effect on the free press. 
A newsworthy story has now been obscured. A local news organization, 
which focused on local corruption and politics, is gone. The next time a 
restaurant tool is used for something it is not meant to, there will be at least 
one fewer news organization to report it. And, while an offbeat story of a 
fight in a seafood restaurant may seem trivial, the stories about local 
government corruption are gone as well. 
This is the legal atmosphere in Europe today. Although the European 
Union and European member states do value freedom of speech, the value 
of speech is balanced against the rights to privacy. In the case of the right to 
be forgotten, however, the European courts fail to properly balance freedom 
of speech and the rights of the public to information. Instead, courts have 
focused on information from a data privacy and data processing 
perspective. In addition, the European courts have put search engines in 
charge of the process of removing articles from view, resulting in collateral 
censorship. This misplaced focus results in newsworthy articles being 
removed and chills freedom of speech. 
But in the United States, there is no such right to be forgotten. Such a 
story would not be taken down; instead, it would be displayed proudly. If 
the subject didn’t want this to be his online reputation, he should have stuck 
his knife in fish, not in his brother. The newspaper has the right to publish 
this story, and the public has the right to access it. And that freedom of 
speech that exists in the United States can be used to help temper the 
excesses that stifle freedom of speech in Europe. 
B. The Right to Be Forgotten: Definitions and Terminology 
The right to be forgotten, also called the right to erasure or the right to 
delist, is the right to have information about oneself removed from public 
view. Unlike many other privacy rights, the right to be forgotten is not 
about a right to block publication. Nor is it about taking down information 
that should never have been in the public to begin with. The right to be 
forgotten is the right to erase, or restrict access to, information already 
legally and rightfully published and disseminated. Thus, while generally 
considered a privacy right, the right to be forgotten is very different from 
much of privacy law, which deals with keeping information safe or private. 
 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. 
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There are two ways to seek the erasure of information from a public 
view. The first is to try to have the original publisher remove the offending 
information from their publicly available website. The second way is to try 
to make the information less accessible by requesting from search engines 
(hereinafter “Google” due to the fact that the main cases involve Google) to 
delist the information. Since the main cases involve Google, this article will 
use Google as shorthand for this method. From the subject’s perspective, 
delisting may be most effective, if the goal is to prevent reputational harm 
by limiting the connection between the subject’s name and the 
embarrassing story. Either way, the story is effectively gone from the public 
eye. 
The nomenclature of the “right to be forgotten” can be inexact and 
confusing. Strictly speaking, the right this article refers to is a right to 
erasure. The subject makes a request to erase an article from an online 
publication, or to erase the link between the article and the subject’s name 
in a search engine’s index, which is called delisting. There is no way to 
make people forget information. But the term “right to be forgotten” is the 
most common term encountered in researching this subject. It is also useful 
when separating rights to block publication or secure personal data from a 
right to delete published information, and accurately captures the concept of 
a right to put things back in the box. 
C. The Right to be Forgotten in the United States and the European Union 
The right to be forgotten is not universally recognized. This paper 
analyzes two legal jurisdictions: the European Union, which has a right to 
be forgotten, and the United States, which does not. 
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Part II reviews the right to 
be forgotten and the right to delist in the European Union, and discusses the 
difficulties encountered in the implementation of these rights. Part III 
discusses the framework of privacy law in the United States, and details 
why there is no right to be forgotten, nor is it likely that any such right will 
be introduced. Part IV discusses the conflict between the European Union, 
where there is a right to be forgotten, and other jurisdictions, such as the 
United States, which does not have this right. Part IV continues by 
analyzing several proposals to harmonize the systems by incorporating a 
right to be forgotten in the United States, and concludes that they are 
contrary to existing jurisprudence and policy. This Part will also explain 
that the United States would be ill-advised to go down the path that Europe 
has. Moreover, European publishers should take advantage of the recent 
European Court of Justice decision which allows for access in the European 
Union to international sources to protect their publications from the 
draconian right to be forgotten by hosting their articles internationally. Part 
V concludes. 
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II. THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
A. Legal and Historical Background 
European Union caselaw introduced12 the right to be forgotten and the 
right to be delisted in the landmark Costeja case.13 This right was then 
integrated into European privacy law in the General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR).14 The GDPR governs privacy law in the European 
Union,15 but it has ramifications for worldwide businesses, search engines, 
and media outlets. One of the provisions of the GDPR is the “right to be 
forgotten” (also known as the right to erasure), which is covered by Article 
17.16 
Under this provision, and in accordance with the preceding caselaw, 
after a certain amount of time, a person may request that information about 
them be removed from the internet.17 
1. Costeja and the Right to Delist 
The right to be forgotten has older roots but more recently stems from 
the 2014 Costeja case.18 Costeja introduced the right to be forgotten and the 
right to delist at the European Union level.19 Costeja predated the GDPR, 
and is based on the 1995 Data Protection Directive (DPD).20 The Costeja 
case started in 2010 at the local level in Spain and culminated in the 
European Court of Justice ordering Google to delist search results, despite 
the fact that Google had not created and did not own the offending 
content.21 
Costeja González had property publicly auctioned off in a regional 
newspaper some time before. He filed a request with the Agencia Española 
de Protección de Datos (AEPD), Spain’s data protection agency, asking 
that the auction listing be taken down from the newspaper’s website, and 
also that Google searches of his name not produce this link.22 The AEPD 
ruled that the newspaper did not have to take down the posting, since it was 
 
 12 While some member states had an independent right to be forgotten previously, this 
case introduced the right throughout the European Union to all member states. 
 13 Case C-131/12, GoogleSpain S.L. v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, 2014 
E.C.R. 317. 
 14 Commission Regulation 2016/679, art. 17, 2016 J.O. (119) 1. 
 15 Commission Regulation 2016/679, 2016 J.O. (119) 1. 
 16 Commission Regulation 2016/679, supra note 14, at 43. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Case C-131/12, Google Spain S.L. v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, 2014 
E.C.R. 317. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC). 
 21 Case C-131/12, Google Spain S.L. v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, 2014 
E.C.R. 317. 
 22 Id. ¶¶ 14-17. 
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properly advertised “upon order of the Ministry of Labour and Social 
Affairs and was intended to give maximum publicity to the auction in order 
to secure as many bidders as possible,” but that Google could possibly be 
required to delist the information from its indexed searches.23 The case then 
went on the European Court of Justice to determine whether Google had to 
delist the search result. The court addressed two main issues: first, if 
Google was subject to European regulations, and second, if there exists a 
right to be forgotten. 
On the jurisdictional issue and the applicability of the DPD to Google, 
the Court of Justice ruled that Google Spain is subject to European Union 
law.24 The court also ruled that Google, as a search engine operator, is a 
“controller” that conducts the processing of personal data in the context of 
the DPD.25 However, the court avoided ruling on whether Google’s non-
Spain activities were subject to E.U. law.26 This further jurisdictional 
question would not be resolved until the later CNIL case in 2019. 
On the substantive question of whether Costeja González had the right 
to request removal of the information, the court ruled that there exists a 
right to be forgotten, and that this right applies to delisting from a Google 
search.27 The court found that after a certain amount of time, a person has 
the right to request that their name not be linked to an old story.28 The court 
held that an individual’s right to privacy outweighs the public’s interest in 
the information and the interests of the search engine operator.29 
“[I]nclusion in the list of results, displayed following a search made on the 
basis of a person’s name” interferes with a person’s right to privacy.30 
[T]he operator of a search engine is obliged to remove from the list of 
results displayed following a search made on the basis of a person’s name 
links to web pages, published by third parties and containing information 
relating to that person, also in a case where that name or information is not 
erased beforehand or simultaneously from those web pages, and even, as 
the case may be, when its publication in itself on those pages is lawful.31 
This result may seem counterintuitive. The information was legally 
published, and in this case, there was not even an enforceable right to 
erasure from the original publisher. But the court still found that Google’s 
search engine was “processing of data” that violated Costeja González’s 
rights.32 Including the right to be forgotten as a data processing issue, even 
 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. ¶ 60. 
 25 Id. ¶¶ 26-28, 41, 57. 
 26 Id. ¶ 61. 
 27 Id. ¶¶ 92-99. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. ¶ 87. 
 31 Id. ¶ 88 (emphasis added). 
 32 Council Directive 95/46, art. 14, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC). 
Send the Word Over There 
41:245 (2021) 
253 
where the underlying data is allowed to be public, confirms the concept of a 
right to erase information that is lawfully published. 
With Costeja, the right to be forgotten, and the right to be delisted 
from a search, became law in the European Union. 
2. CNIL and the Limits to European Jurisdiction 
In 2015, the Commission nationale de l’informatique et des libertés 
(CNIL), France’s data protection authority, demanded that Google de-
reference requests from not only Google France, but from all of Google’s 
domain name extensions.33 Google refused, and was fined 100,000 Euros.34 
The French authority’s view was that all of Google’s websites needed to 
comply with European law. The Court of Justice did not agree, ruling that a 
search engine is not required to de-reference a search made on a version of 
the search engine not intended for the European Union.35 The court ruled 
however, that the search engine must: 
“effectively prevent or, at the very least, seriously discourage an internet 
user conducting a search from one of the Member States on the basis of a 
data subject’s name from gaining access, via the list of results displayed 
following that search, to the links which are the subject of that request.”36 
3. From DPD to GDPR 
The 1996 Data Protection Directive was superseded by the GDPR in 
2016, effective 2018.37 The DPD had become outdated and was considered 
ill-suited to the modern data privacy processing.38 The GDPR is designed, 
among other things, to protect privacy retroactively.39 In addition, the 
GDPR introduced much heftier fines for data breaches up to 4% of annual 
turnover—a similar fine amount to antitrust violations.40 
The right to be forgotten is expressly enumerated in the GDPR, which 
provides specific steps for data controllers to follow in erasing 
information.41 The court in Google v. CNIL42 analyzed the issues based on 
 
 33 Case C-507/17, Google LLC v. Comm’n nationale de l’informatique et des libertés, 
2019 E.C.R. 772 ¶ 30. [hereinafter Google v. CNIL]. 
 34 Id. ¶¶ 31, 33. 
 35 Id. ¶ 62-65. 
 36 Id. ¶ 73. 
 37 Commission Regulation 2016/679, art. 94, 2016 J.O. (119) 1. 
 38 Lawrence Siry, Forget Me, Forget Me Not: Reconciling Two Different Paradigms of 
the Right to Be Forgotten, 103 KY. L.J. 311, 325 (2014). 
 39 Id. at 326. 
 40 Samuel Gibbs, European parliament approves tougher data privacy rules, THE 
GUARDIAN, (Apr. 14, 2016) https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/apr/14/european-
parliament-approve-tougher-data-privacy-rules. 
 41 Commission Regulation 2016/679, art. 17, 2016 J.O. (119) 1. 
 42 See supra, Part II.A.2. 
Northwestern Journal of 
International Law & Business 41:245 (2021) 
254 
both the DPD and the GDPR.43 The definitions of “process” and 
“controller” in both the DPD and the GDPR are notably very similar.44 
Although the Costeja and CNIL cases predate the GDPR, the legal standard 
is the same. 
This is thus the framework of the right to be forgotten under the 
GDPR. Any subject, with information that is outdated, irrelevant, or no 
longer of use to the data controller, can request that the information be 
erased from the original website, or delisted from a search engine. Any 
website or search engine servicing anywhere in the European Union must 
comply with the request. But an international website or search engine or an 
international version of a website or search engine does not have to comply 
with this European regulation. 
B. Complications with the European Right to be Forgotten 
1. Problems of Practical Enforcement and Excessive Censorship 
Google’s compliance with the right to be forgotten has been far from 
smooth. The responsibility placed on the search engine to deal with, and 
ultimately decide, each request to delist a search engine result has led to 
criticism of Google’s role. As one critic put it, “Google is taking decisions 
that are publicly relevant. As such, it is becoming almost like a court or 
government, but without the fundamental checks on its power.”45 
Robert Peston wrote about the experience of being delisted without 
explanation.46 In 2014, after Costeja, the BBC received a notice from 
Google that they were delisting a 2007 article about Stan O’Neal, the 
former chairman and CEO of Merrill Lynch.47 The notice from Google 
simply stated, “Notice of removal from Google Search: we regret to inform 
 
 43 Google v. CNIL, supra note 33, at 40,41. 
 44 Compare the DPD definition of data processing: “‘processing of personal data’ 
(‘processing’) shall mean any operation or set of operations which is performed upon 
personal data, whether or not by automatic means, such as collection, recording, 
organization, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by 
transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, 
blocking, erasure or destruction” (Council Directive 95/46, art. 2(b), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 
(EC)) with the GDPR definition of data processing: “‘processing’ means any operation or set 
of operations which is performed on personal data or on sets of personal data, whether or not 
by automated means, such as collection, recording, organization [sic], structuring, storage, 
adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, 
dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, restriction, erasure 
or destruction” (Commission Regulation 2016/679, art. 4(2), 2016 J.O. (119) 1). 
 45 Sylvia Tippman & Julia Powles, Google accidentally reveals data on ‘right to be 
forgotten’ requests, THE GUARDIAN (July 14, 2015) https://www.theguardian.com/ 
technology/2015/jul/14/google-accidentally-reveals-right-to-be-forgotten-requests. 
 46 Robert Peston, Why Has Google Cast Me into Oblivion?, BBC NEWS, https:// 
www.bbc.com/news/business-28130581 (July 2, 2014). 
 47 Id. 
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you that we are no longer able to show the following pages from your 
website in response to certain searches on European versions of Google: 
[the URL of the delisted page],” with no details or explanations.48 
How, asked Peston, was an article about a prominent public figure 
related to the financial crisis “inadequate, irrelevant or no longer relevant,” 
in the words of Costeja?49 Peston notes that being delisted by Google 
“means that to all intents and purposes the article has been removed from 
the public record, given that Google is the route to information and stories 
for most people.”50 
There is some ambiguity as to the extent of the Peston delisting. In an 
update, Peston wrote that the story had not been completely delisted but 
was instead only delisted from being found in connection to a search by 
name of the commenters on the article.51 However, a contemporaneous 
account in Recombu claims that the search was censored from a search 
result using Google’s United Kingdom version of the search engine, but not 
from a United States version of the search engine result.52 
Peston is not the only journalist to have seen his story disappear. Three 
articles about a football53 referee who lied about a call and was forced out 
as a result were delisted as of July 2015.54 The search for the referee’s name 
in the United States version of Google showed the articles, but the exact 
same search in the United Kingdom version did not.55 (In an interesting 
quirk, the search did find the article when searching “Scottish referee who 
lied” without the referee’s name, in line with the Costeja ruling requiring 
delinking from the subject’s name.)56 Other articles that disappeared from a 
Google search include an article about an attorney running for a seat on the 
Law Society’s ruling board while facing fraud charges, and a weekly index 
of articles in the Guardian.57 
Peston suggests that Google may have been too zealous in delisting 
this search result and may not actually have had to delist it.58 But therein 
lies the problem. This overzealousness is an inevitable complication that 
 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Rene Millman, Google’s right to be forgotten creates Streisand effect, RECOMBU 
(July 3, 2014), https://recombu.com/digital/article/google-creates-streisand-effect-bbc-mail-
guardian. 
 53 Soccer. 
 54 James Ball, EU’s right to be forgotten: Guardian articles have been hidden by 
Google, THE GUARDIAN (July 2, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/ 
2014/jul/02/eu-right-to-be-forgotten-guardian-google. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Peston, supra note 46. 
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results from a framework that places the burden on the search engine to 
determine what content needs to be removed or delisted. It may make 
financial sense for Google to err on the side of delisting in order to avoid a 
tedious analysis or the risk of being fined. However, Google’s prudence has 
far-reaching consequences to the author, to the publication, and to the 
wealth of knowledge accessible to the public. 
Google has set up a website to demonstrate transparency and 
compliance with this rule.59 As of January 3, 2021, Google delisted 
1,825,591 URLs, out of a total of 3,900,836 URLs for which delisting was 
requested.60 Google employs “an army of [paralegals]” to deal with all of 
these requests.61 When Google is the gatekeeper determining what should 
be delisted, without oversight, there is a problem of collateral censorship: 
censorship that isn’t imposed by the law, but results from the legal 
framework.62 Here, the legal framework requires Google to determine 
which articles hosted by publishers should be hidden from the internet. It 
may seem like a minor thing to delist a search engine link, but the article 
then sinks into obscurity, and that has an effect on freedom of expression.63 
2. The (Im)balance Between the Right to Be Forgotten and Freedom of 
Speech. 
In theory, the right to be forgotten in the European Union is limited by 
freedom of speech and expression.64 In practice, the right to be forgotten 
has clashed with media interests and free speech, and some local media 
companies have had to shut down due to excessive litigation over the right 
to be forgotten.65 “[I]n Italy at least, ‘the right to be forgotten’ now has a 
new meaning: the right to remove inconvenient journalism from archives 
after two years.”66 PrimaDaNoi, the Italian local news organization in the 
story this paper started with, received 240 requests for deletions and 
 
 59 Transparency Report, GOOGLE, https://transparencyreport.google.com/eu-privacy/ 
overview (last visited Jan. 3, 2021). 
 60 Id. 
 61 Peston, supra note 46. 
 62 See generally Ira Rubinstein & Bilyana Petkova, The International Impact of the 
General Data Protection Regulation, COMMENTARY ON THE GENERAL DATA PROTECTION 
REGULATION (forthcoming). 
 63 Miquel Peguera, The Shaky Ground of the Right to be Delisted, 18 VAND. J. ENT. & 
TECH. L. 507, 556 (2016). 
 64 Commission Regulation 2016/679, art. 17(3)(a), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1. 
 65 Hazard Owen, The Offshore Journalism Project Would Let Newsrooms Send a 
“Distress Signal” When Their Content Is at Risk of Being Lost Forever, NIEMAN LAB (Jan. 
8, 2018), https://www.niemanlab.org/2018/01/the-offshore-journalism-project-would-let-
news rooms-send-a-distress-signal-when-their-content-is-at-risk-of-being-lost-forever/. 
 66 Athalie Matthews, How Italian Courts Used the Right to Be Forgotten to Put an 
Expiry Date on News, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 20, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/media/ 
2016/sep/20/how-italian-courts-used-the-right-to-be-forgotten-to-put-an-expiry-date-on-
news. 
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eventually gave up trying to fight them in court.67 The site shut down for 
good in 2018.68 Other publications simply comply with these requests and 
do not fight them.69 
Scholars have noted that the court in Costeja did not even consider the 
right of freedom of expression in its balance between the data subject and 
the data controller, instead focusing on the balance between corporate 
interests and access to information.70 Instead of balancing the privacy rights 
of the subject with the fundamental freedom of expression and information, 
the Court focused on the access to the information.71 The Court is also 
criticized for not laying out clear criteria to use to balance the competing 
interests.72 Instead, the Court operates from a presumption of privacy and 
data protection, balanced only against the public interest to access the 
information.73 The Costeja court’s focus on the access and data protection 
aspects represents a right that emerges from a broad data protection act, not 
from a personal right. 
Despite the criticism on legal, practical, and policy grounds, the right 
to be forgotten in the European Union remains. Any subject can complain 
about an article about them that they do not like, and can either get the 
article removed, or get the article hidden from search results on European 
Union versions of a search engine. But these rights do not exist in many 
other jurisdictions, including the United States. 
III. THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN IN THE UNITED STATES 
The right to be forgotten “is not recognized in the United States.”74 If 
the right were to be recognized, it would need to be introduced either as a 
new right or through some existing privacy right since the United States 
does not have a national privacy or data protection statute. The trend in 
United States law is against the kind of dignitary or retroactive privacy 
rights such as a right to be forgotten, and towards a presumption of freedom 
of speech. This makes it difficult for a right to be forgotten to be 
introduced. 
 
 67 Satariano & Bubola, supra note 4. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Peguera, supra note 63, at 555. 
 71 MARIA TZANOU, The Unexpected Consequences of the EU Right to Be Forgotten: 
Internet Search Engines as Fundamental Rights Adjudicators in PERSONAL DATA 
PROTECTION AND LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 279-301 (ed. Maria 
Tzanou, 2020). 
 72 Id. at 284. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 745 (9th Cir. 2015). 
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A. The Current Legal Status 
No Federal court to date has recognized a right to be forgotten. A 2015 
case from the Second Circuit Court of Appeals helps elucidate how courts 
in the United States have reacted to attempts to introduce a right to be 
forgotten. In Martin v. Hearst Corporation, the court ruled that a local news 
organization did not have to remove an article about an individual who was 
arrested for a crime but ultimately not charged.75 The cause of action in that 
case was the tort of defamation, and not an attempt to introduce a direct 
right to be forgotten. The court’s position was that reporting factual events 
is not defamation since people know that not all arrests lead to guilty 
verdicts.76 A right to be forgotten does not enter the equation. 
In another case that had the potential to be groundbreaking, a New 
Jersey court ordered Google to remove Google search results related to an 
older incident.77 The case, Malandrucco v. Google, Inc., involved images 
showing the effects of police brutality. Interestingly, it was the victim of the 
beating, a man not charged with a crime, who requested removal of the 
images. Although the images did not implicate him with a crime, and, if 
anything, made him look sympathetic, Malandrucco was apparently simply 
tired of people Googling him and seeing graphic photos of him after the 
beating. To him, the pictures may have been a source of embarrassment and 
an invasion of privacy. The most vulnerable moment in his life had now 
become the defining characteristic of his online presence. 
Unfortunately for the development of United States caselaw, 
Malandrucco would drop the case after it was removed to federal court on 
diversity jurisdictional grounds.78 It is not known why Malandrucco 
dropped the lawsuit. It could have been because of the risks of the 
“Streisand Effect”, which is the phenomenon where people trying to make 
information go away by making a big deal about it, have the opposite effect 
as intended and make the story far more famous.79 In this example, it is 
possible that the plaintiff was wary of this happening to him and decided to 
withdraw his suit once the case was getting more prominence in federal 
court. This may be an inhibition in the development of privacy caselaw, 
since plaintiffs may have apprehensions of being the trendsetter. 
It is also possible that the plaintiff withdrew the case because he 
 
 75 Martin v. Hearst Corp., 777 F.3d 546, 553 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 76 Id. 
 77 Eugene Volokh, N.J. Court Orders Google to Vanish Plaintiff’s Photo—Published at 
the Chicago Tribune—From Search Results, REASON: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 3, 
2018), https://reason.com/2018/08/03/nj-court-orders-google-to-vanish-plainti/ [hereinafter 
Volokh on Malandrucco]. 
 78 Eugene Volokh, Plaintiff Dropping Case in Which He Got Order to Google to Vanish 
Photo from Search Results, REASON: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 13, 2018), 
https://reason.com/volokh/2018/08/13/plaintiff-dropping-case-in-which-he-got/. 
 79 T.C., What Is the Streisand Effect?, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 16, 2013), https:// 
www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2013/04/15/what-is-the-streisand-effect. 
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expected to lose in federal court or lacked the financial resources to pursue 
a prolonged lawsuit. It may also be that Google complied with the request 
in order to prevent a precedent.80 Constitutional scholar and professor 
Eugene Volokh, in reviewing the case, assessed the chances of a federal 
court finding that Malandrucco had the right to compel Google to delist 
search results as very slim.81 
Pending any changes, the right to be forgotten does not exist in the 
United States. The nature of the way privacy law developed in the United 
States makes it unlikely that there will be a right to be forgotten in the 
United States. In order to understand why, an introduction to privacy law in 
the United States is in order. 
B. Overview of Privacy Law in the United States 
Privacy law in the United States, in stark contrast to the framework in 
the European Union, does not stem from one overall privacy statute. 
Instead, privacy rights are scattered throughout the legal system, and each 
category of privacy rights may stem from several sources of law. There are 
statutes that cover individual industries and actions82; there are various torts 
related to privacy right, from older common law torts to newer privacy 
torts; and there are constitutional rights, both explicit83 and implied84. 
The first modern attempt to clarify privacy was an 1890 article by 
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis.85 Warren and Brandeis were concerned 
mainly with reputational damage and dignitary harm.86 They proposed 
introducing new privacy torts to the law.87 The article had a huge influence 
on American privacy law. By 1960, William Prosser, a well-known expert 
on tort law, was able to identify over 300 court cases inspired by the 
Warren and Brandeis article.88 The four Warren and Brandeis inspired torts, 
as defined by Prosser, are: (1) Intrusion; (2) Public Disclosure; (3) False 
Light Publicity; and (4) Appropriation of Likeness.89 
Aside from these torts, there have been other developments in privacy 
law in the United States. More recently, Professor Daniel Solove proposed 
 
 80 A Google search of the name “Malandrucco” made on December 14, 2020, did not 
produce the offending images or articles. 
 81 Volokh on Malandrucco, supra note 77. 
 82 See, e.g., Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) 
(governing health privacy). 
 83 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. IV (governing unreasonable searches). 
 84 See, e.g., the decisional privacy cases. 
 85 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 
(1890). 
 86 See id. at 195-96. 
 87 Id. at 219. 
 88 William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 388 (1960). 
 89 Id at 389. 
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a new taxonomy of privacy law to bring this area of law more up to date.90 
Solove identified sixteen different privacy rights within four overall 
categories.91 The full list of privacy rights as enumerated by Solove are: (A) 
Information Collecting, two rights: (1) Surveillance, and (2) Interrogation; 
(B) Information processing, five rights: (3) Aggregation, (4) Identification, 
(5) Insecurity, (6) Secondary Use, and (7) Exclusion; (C) Dissemination, 
seven rights: (8) Breach of Confidentiality, (9) Disclosure, (10) Exposure, 
(11) Increased Accessibility, (12) Blackmail, (13) Appropriation or 
Exploitation, (14) Distortion; and (D) Invasion, two rights: (15) Intrusion 
and (16) Decisional Interference.92 
These categories define the ideas of privacy, but not the source of 
laws. Within the categories listed by Professor Solove are various sources 
of law and inconsistent application.93 For example, Interrogation (category 
2 above, defined by Professor Solove as “the pressuring of individuals to 
divulge information”94) is not a single, coherent right, but is instead a group 
of rights, which include the Fifth Amendment right to refuse questions from 
the government about a crime, the First Amendment right when being 
questioned by the government about one’s associations and beliefs, 
evidentiary privileges from both common law and court rules, as well as 
more recent statutes protecting employees from employers, rape shield 
laws, and others.95 
The difficulty with the taxonomy and the lack of structure in privacy 
law in the United States extends beyond a simple technical problem of 
creating a list of what rights exist. These different rights do not come 
together to create a cohesive body of law. For a law professor writing an 
exam, a legal topic that covers many issues dotting the landscape is the 
ideal opportunity for an issue spotter. But from a practical perspective, 
many of these rights are ill-defined and patchy. Unlike the GDPR, with its 
framework of processors and data responsibilities, the landscape of privacy 
rights in the United States does not provide a framework to introduce a 
right to be forgotten. Because each individual law stands on its own island, 
so to speak, application to other situations such as the right to be forgotten 
would not flow naturally without a specific statue. 
 
 
 90 See generally Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PENN. L. REV. 477 
(2006). 
 91 Id. at 488-91. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Indeed, a point of Solove’s article was to propose a new taxonomy, and to point out 
these inconsistencies. 
 94 Solove, supra note 90, at 500. 
 95 Id. at 499, 502-03. 
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C. Categorizing a Right to Be Forgotten 
The right to be forgotten does not sit easily in any of the Solove 
privacy categories, or even in any of Solove’s four groupings. The first 
grouping involves information collection. A right to be forgotten can be 
included in “information,” as the European courts view it. But Solove’s 
grouping only covers information gathered illicitly. The information 
collection rights that Solove identifies do not include a right to later require 
removal of information that was gathered properly. The third 
(dissemination) and fourth (invasion) groupings also do not apply: the 
dissemination aspects of the third grouping cover areas such as distortion or 
exposure, where there was a fraud of sorts, and in the fourth grouping there 
is no “invasion” at any point. 
One could theorize a right to be forgotten through the second 
(information processing) grouping or through the aggregation, 
identification, or increased accessibility categories, which apply to the issue 
of the Google search aggregating all known information easily in a few 
clicks and linking it to a person’s name. This would require a broader 
recognition of data processing rights, recognizing a search engine as a data 
processer that, in the aggregation of data, causes a social harm and that can 
be prevented from listing search engine results which a subject does not 
want. Like the European framework, this could introduce a right to be 
forgotten from the data processing angle. Unlike the European framework, 
such an approach would not introduce the direct right to erasure from the 
original publishers; it introduces only a right to delist search engine results. 
However, the European courts were able to rely on a robust underlying 
statute defining the roles of a controller and process. Without such a 
framework in the United States, it is hard to see how a court could find that 
Google has a data processing responsibility based on gathering public 
information. 
1. Privacy Law and Dignitary Harms 
Solove notes that the Fifth Amendment’s right to be free from 
interrogation (category 2 in his taxonomy) is restricted to where there are 
criminal consequences and does not protect dignitary or employment 
harms.96 “Privacy law’s theory of interrogation is not only incoherent, it is 
nearly nonexistent. Despite recognizing the harms and problems of 
interrogation—compulsion, divulgence of private information, and forced 
betrayal—the law only addresses them in limited situations.”97 
A privacy right that recognizes the dignitary harms in interrogations 
would provide greater protection in a variety of human interactions. For 
example, such a right might eliminate “the box” in job applications asking 
 
 96 Id. at 503-04. 
 97 Id. at 504. 
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if an applicant has a criminal record.98 This would enable applicants to have 
a fresh start, move on with their lives, and leave the mistakes of the past 
behind, a right very similar to a right to be forgotten. 
However, the legal framework in the United States does not recognize 
such dignitary rights as an inherent component of a right to be free from 
interrogation. Instead, “interrogation” is a stand-alone protection from the 
government, and any additional right will need to be introduced via 
legislation. This demonstrates how the United States’ patchwork of privacy 
rights fails to come together and recognize a right that can be easily applied 
to new situations. The right to be forgotten is about reputational and 
dignitary harms and would not fit in with the current framework. 
The right to be forgotten is, at its core, a dignitary right to allow a 
subject to erase prior misdeeds. A legal system that does not recognize 
dignitary harms would not find a place for a right to be forgotten. But, so 
far, there is no reason why a right to be forgotten could not be introduced in 
future scholarships and legislation. The Secrecy Paradigm, discussed in the 
next sub-part, and the Truthfulness principle, discussed later,99 explain why 
the right to be forgotten not only had no place in the United States’ current 
system of privacy rights, but would also be extremely unfavored. 
2. The Secrecy Paradigm 
Among other critiques of privacy law in the United States, Solove also 
critiques the law’s approach to surveillance. The real issue with 
surveillance, according to Solove, is that it is a “tool of social control.”100 
The awareness of being under surveillance creates a chilling effect.101 Big 
Brother is watching you. And yet, the law only addresses surveillance from 
the prism where it takes place—that is, in public or private—as opposed to 
what it does.102 This is part of what Professor Solove calls the “secrecy 
paradigm”: 
Under the secrecy paradigm, privacy is tantamount to complete 
secrecy, and a privacy violation occurs when concealed data is revealed to 
others. If the information is not previously hidden, then no privacy interest 
is implicated by the collection or dissemination of the information. In many 
areas of law, this narrow view of privacy has limited the recognition of 
privacy violations.103 
 
 98 See Take the Fair Change Pledge, BAN THE BOX, http://bantheboxcampaign.org (last 
visited Dec. 4, 2020) (advocating for a “Ban of the Box” on employment applications, in 
order to “give people with past convictions a fair chance”). 
 99 Infra, Part III.C.4. 
 100 Solove, supra note 90, at 493. 
 101 Id. at 495–99. 
 102 Id. at 495–99. 
 103 Id. at 497 (citing DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND 
PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 42–44 (2004)). 
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One of those “privacy violations” whose recognition is limited by the 
secrecy paradigm is the right to be forgotten. The right to be forgotten is the 
right to delete information legitimately made public. It is a dignitary right 
that does not fit in with the secrecy paradigm. 
Solove lists a number of cases where courts in the United States have 
found that there is no right to privacy since information was already public. 
Most of these cases involve torts of intrusion. In Solove’s taxonomy, these 
would be included either in intrusion or in exposure. For example, a couple 
filmed being wrongfully arrested did not have a right to privacy because it 
was in public.104 The sexual orientation of the man who saved President 
Ford and was outed was not a secret since this information was already 
known to hundreds of people.105 The address of a former Columbian judge 
who had a bounty on her head from drug lords was not private because 
several people already knew the address.106 
To be clear, Solove decries the secrecy paradigm and sees it as a fault 
in how courts in the United States have approached privacy law. But is it 
this “faulty” secrecy paradigm that explains why the right to be forgotten 
does not fit in the legal framework of privacy law in the United States? 
Privacy law in the United States focuses on secrecy, and anything that is 
already non-secret is outside of the realm of privacy. A published article is 
already non-secret because the cat is out of the bag. 
The standard of how many people have to know something before it is 
considered public information is not precisely delineated and can vary by 
court. In fact, some courts have held that just by sharing information with a 
small circle of acquaintances a subject did not render “otherwise private 
information public by cooperating in the criminal investigation and seeking 
solace from friends and relatives.”107 But these courts are still operating 
within the secrecy paradigm. They are not recognizing a right to restrict 
public information; rather, they are expanding the definition of what is 
considered “secret” to include information shared with a small group of 
people. Lior Strahilevitz has argued that the definition of “disclosure” 
should be based on the expectations of the subject. Information disclosure 
would occur when information travels beyond the subject’s expectations.108 
This standard has not been adopted by the courts.109 But even the 
Strahilevitz standard is limited to preventing the containment of 
information, since it relies on the expectations of disclosure. There is no 
basis for a right to roll back expected disclosure. 
 
 104 Penwell v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 469 N.E.2d 1025 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984). 
 105 Sipple v. Chronicle Publishing Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 665, 669 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). 
 106 Duran v. Detroit News, Inc., 504 N.W.2d 715, 718 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993). 
 107 Times-Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, 244 Cal. Rptr. 556, 561 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); 
Solove, supra note 90, at 532 n.310. 
 108 Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Network’s Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 
919, 974 (2005). 
 109 Id.; Solove, supra note 90, at 532. 
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Some courts have seemingly abandoned the secrecy paradigm when 
the disclosure involves personal dignity.110 These different cases that 
involve personal privacy in public spaces are defined by Professor Solove’s 
taxonomy as “exposure” and are distinct because of the social norms 
attached to nudity and personal dignity.111 But even where courts have 
found the right to privacy in a public space, the logic depends on the 
inherent private nature of the activity captured. Despite being in a public 
space, there may still be an expectation of privacy norms for accidental 
nudity.112 However, the element of personal dignity merely informs the 
standard of expectations of secrecy, and there is no recognition of a 
dignitary right on its own. 
The different perspectives on the spread of information, thus, differ 
only in what information is considered public. The assumption remains that 
once information has spread into the public sphere, it remains there and 
cannot be put back in the box. 
3. Intellectual Property, Copyright and Privacy 
The Malandrucco case discussed above raises some fascinating 
questions about copyright and the right to be forgotten. One of the legal 
arguments made by Malandrucco was a copyright claim.113 It should be 
noted that even if there is a successful path to using copyright law to 
remove and delist information about oneself, it would be limited to 
something that is copyrightable (for example, a picture) and where the 
subject actually owns the copyright to the picture.114 Even there, the subject 
is unlikely to win, since the copyright principle of “fair use” would 
probably allow use of a copyrighted image for a news story.115 
Professor Eugene Volokh argues against what was, in 2000, a growing 
body of scholarship arguing that people should have a property right to 
information about themselves.116 This view would have allowed people to 
stop publications from writing about them.117 Volokh forcefully argues that: 
 
 110 Compare Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 162 So. 2d 474, 476-78 (Ala. 1964) 
(woman photographed when wind blew up her skirt had the right to protection from indecent 
and vulgar violation of privacy), with McNamara v. Freedom Newspapers, Inc., 802 S.W.2d 
901 (Tex. App. 1991) (participant in public athletic performance had no right to privacy 
when genitalia was photographed and published in local paper). 
 111 Solove, supra note 90, at 533–36 (see his definition of exposure v. disclosure and 
critique of the lack of definition in the courts for it). 
 112 See Graham, 162 So. 2d 474, 476 (Ala. 1964). 
 113 Volokh on Malandrucco, supra note 77. 
 114 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 201 (1976). 
 115 See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Privative Copyright, 73 VAND. L. REV. 22–24 (2020). 
 116 Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling 
Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 
1063 (2000) [hereinafter Volokh on Freedom and Privacy]. 
 117 Id. 
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“Calling a speech restriction a ‘property right,’ though, doesn’t make it 
any less a speech restriction, and it doesn’t make it constitutionally 
permissible. Broad, pre-New York Times v. Sullivan libel laws can be 
characterized as protecting a property right in reputation; in fact, some 
states consider reputation a property interest.”118 
Thus, even if one sees an intellectual property right to personal 
information about individuals, Supreme Court First Amendment 
jurisprudence as expressed in New York Times v. Sullivan119 would still 
allow the offending material to be published. Volokh also notes that the 
copyright distinction between ideas (which cannot be copyrighted) and 
expression (which can be copyrighted) reflects a strong free speech 
presumption.120 “Copyright’s idea/expression dichotomy121 strikes a 
definitional balance between the First Amendment and the Copyright Act 
by permitting free communication of facts while still protecting an author’s 
expression.”122 Intellectual property is not a pathway to a right to be 
forgotten. 
4. Distortion, the First Amendment and Truthfulness 
Solove’s taxonomy groups the older common law tort of defamation, 
the Warren and Brandeis-inspired false light tort, and various modern 
statues giving a right to correct inaccurate information in databases into 
Distortion.123 This could appear to be a way to introduce a right to be 
delisted via data controllers. But long-standing caselaw in the United States 
restricts defamation to falsehoods. In the landmark case New York Times v. 
Sullivan, the United States Supreme Court balanced speech and public 
debate against privacy and reputation, and speech won.124 “Truth trumps 
privacy.”125 The First Amendment is a “major restraint” on American 
privacy law.126 It is perhaps ironic that the right to be forgotten has not 
found its place in the United States, land of the American Dream of leaving 
one’s life behind and starting fresh.127 In other areas of law such as 
bankruptcy, the United States has been at the forefront of allowing people 
 
 118 Id. 
 119 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 120 Volokh on Freedom and Privacy, supra note 116, at 1066 (citing Harper & Row v. 
Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985)). 
 121 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). An “idea” in copyright refers to an umbrella category that 
includes any “idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or 
discovery.” 
 122 Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985). 
 123 Solove, supra note 90, at 546–48. 
 124 Siry, supra note 38, at 330–31 (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 
(1964)). 
 125 Id. at 331. 
 126 Id. at 328. 
 127 Id. at 313. 
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to start over.128 But there is another competing value here, that of the 
freedom of speech. 
The current First Amendment framework would, therefore, make a 
right to erase factual information virtually impossible, since the right to be 
forgotten is about erasing information, even accurate information, that was 
lawfully published. The residual privacy rights to protection from distortion 
only refer to inaccurate information. If a subject alleges that compiling or 
presenting information distorts the facts or circumstances, the cause of 
action would still be the inherent dishonesty of the publisher, and not the 
right to be forgotten as it exists in the European Union. There can only be 
an objection where the publisher never had the right to present the 
information in this misleading way. This is very distinct from a right to be 
forgotten where the information is accurate and truthful. 
The right to be forgotten, therefore, has no position in United States 
law. There is no current federal legal standard in the United States that 
would include this right. Further, it would come into conflict with the 
secrecy paradigm and the principle of truthfulness. Long-standing Supreme 
Court decisions allow publications of truthful information, and recent 
opinions by the Second and Ninth Circuits courts have disclaimed any right 
to be forgotten. 
IV. JURISDICTIONAL CLASH BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
AND THE UNITED STATES 
The legal and constitutional approaches towards privacy and freedom 
of speech are very different in the European Union and in the United States. 
The United States legal system values free speech above all,129 while the 
European Union values privacy more. The European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) provides a fundamental right to privacy that does not exist 
in the United States Bill of Rights.130 Furthermore, European value systems 
place a higher premium on personal honor.131 
 
 128 Id. 
 129 Supra Part III.C. 
 130 Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. 005. The full text of the right is as 
follows: 
Article 8 – Right to respect for private and family life 
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence. 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except 
such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests 
of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection 
of the rights and freedoms of others 
 131 May Crockett, The Internet (Never) Forgets, 19 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 151, 159 
(2016) (citing Tom Gara, The Origins of the ‘Right to be Forgotten’: Sir, I Demand a Duel, 
THE WALL ST. J. (May 14, 2014)). 
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While the ECHR also has a freedom of speech right, the wording is 
clearly distinct from the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United 
States. Article 10, Freedom of Expression, of the ECHR states that 
“[e]veryone has the right to freedom of expression,” but also immediately 
states that this right is subject to various restrictions including “the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”132 In contrast, the First 
Amendment simply states that “Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press 
. . . .”133 It is this framework that enabled the European Court of Justice to 
balance the right to be forgotten against the right to speech and come out on 
the side of dignitary rights. 
In a globalized world, these starkly different jurisdictions come into 
conflict with each other. As already seen, the European Court of Justice has 
had to contend with Google’s right to display search results on the 
international versions of its search engine that would be prohibited in the 
European Union. The internet does not always have clear borders and 
boundaries to delineate different legal standards. 
A. Attempts to Harmonize the Jurisdictions 
There have been several attempts and proposals to harmonize the 
European and the American ways of dealing with personal data on the 
internet. Several scholars propose introducing an element of a right to be 
forgotten in the United States.134 Conversely, there are scholars who sound 
the alarm at the encroachment of the European approach on civil liberties 
and freedom of the press.135 
 
 132 Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, art. 10, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. 005. 
 133 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 134 See generally Amy Gajda, Privacy, Press, and the Right to be Forgotten in the United 
States, 93 WASH. L. REV. 201 (2018) (arguing in favor of Right to be Forgotten In the United 
States); Andrea Gallinucci-Martinez, Is the European Right to Be Forgotten Viable in the 
Land of the First Amendment?, 122 PENN ST. L. REV. STATIM 1 (2018) (focusing on a 
specific proposed N.Y. law and proposes to view privacy law via contractual obligations); 
Ben Medeiros, The Reputation-Management Industry and the Prospects for a Right to Be 
Forgotten in the US, 51 FIRST AMEND. STUDIES 14 (2017) (focusing on a reputation-
management industry solution); Michael L. Rustad & Sanna Kulevska, Reconceptualizing 
the Right to be Forgotten to Enable Transatlantic Data Flow, 28 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 349 
(2015) (making the case for a modified right to be forgotten that would be enacted by both 
the United State and the European Union). 
 135 See generally McKay Cunningham, Free Expression, Privacy, and Diminishing 
Sovereignty in the Information Age: The Internationalization of Censorship, 69 ARK. L. REV. 
71, 114 (2016) (critiquing the excesses of the right to be forgotten, this article is nonetheless 
dated by its assumption that European laws would apply worldwide and the EU would be the 
“keeper of the Internet”—Google won its case on September 24, 2019); Miquel Peguera, 
The Shaky Ground of the Right to Be Delisted, 18 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 507 (2016); 
Shaniqua Singleton, Note, Balancing a Right to be Forgotten with a Right to Freedom of 
Expression in the Wake of Google Spain v. AEPD, 44 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 165 (2015); 
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Professor Amy Gajda writes that there is a right to be forgotten in the 
United States.136 Gajda argues that a right to be forgotten is included in the 
tort of public disclosure of private facts.137 Gajda also quotes a series of 
cases from state courts in the 1800s that essentially outlaw publishing 
truthful but “improper” information, such as a clergyman having an 
affair.138 The court doubted the motives of the publishers. 
Throughout the article, Gajda confuses various rights to privacy with 
the right to be forgotten. The first case Gajda uses as support involves a 
person in witness protection who was removed due to the personal security 
of the subject.139 This is clearly a case about information that should never 
have been released, not a right to be forgotten. Another case was about 
keeping information out of the public eye, which would be consistent with 
the secrecy paradigm.140 A key point in the article is the contention that 
“some modern courts believe that individuals in the United States should be 
able to keep their past histories private under certain conditions.”141 Gajda 
infers from this a “right to put one’s embarrassing and hurtful history 
behind him.”142 But there is a big difference between recognizing a 
dignitary privacy right to keeping past secrets private and recognizing a 
right to remove from public view information that is not a secret. 
This old-school dignitary value system was articulated by the Texas 
Court of Appeals in 1878. That court held that it was tortious to suggest that 
someone was “notoriously of bad or infamous character” even if it was a 
true suggestion.143 This type of tort reflects old-fashioned notions of 
gentlemanly conduct and predates the expansion of First Amendment 
freedom of the press rights in such cases as New York Times v. Sullivan.144 
Even allowing for dignitary violation in such a defamation, this case bears 
no connection to the right to be forgotten, since it refers to original 
publication, not removal of justified publication. 
Gajda also cites a series of Supreme Court cases involving the 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) where the court found that information 
such as old rap sheets, death scene photos, and military academy 
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 141 Id. (emphasis added). 
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 143 Id. at 210 n.53 (quoting Morton v. State, 3 Tex. App. 510, 518 (1878)). 
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disciplinary records were considered private.145 Again, these are about 
disclosure, not removal. In addition, the author makes no notice of the fact 
that the FOIA cases involve the question of whether information is exempt 
from disclosure by the government, not the question of whether a private 
citizen would be allowed to publish something. 
Gajda relies on a Seventh Circuit decision in 2015 that rejected a First 
Amendment defense to publishing information obtained illegally, despite 
the accuracy of the information, to support the assertion that United States 
jurisprudence is moving towards a right to be forgotten.146 Notably, 
truthfulness was not an excuse. But even if this becomes the legal standard, 
it will not support a right to be forgotten. As with Daily Times Democrat v. 
Graham,147 the issue is the public disclosure of information that should not 
have been public. It would not apply to information lawfully published. 
B. The Offshore Solution 
The European framework of the right to be forgotten has demonstrated 
many flaws. These include a failure to balance the right to expression 
against the right to privacy, placing the responsibility (and power) of 
delisting on the search engines, expanding the right in areas of public 
interest, and overly harsh remedies that harm the press. Rather than 
attempting to make the United States adopt the European framework in 
some shape, there is another alternative. The legal system in the United 
States can instead be used to provide the balance that is lacking in the 
European right to be forgotten. American freedoms can be used to solve 
European excesses that threaten to stifle freedom of speech.148 
The roadmap to this solution rests in the recent CNIL case, where 
Google won the right to list on its international sites the links to articles that 
are “banned” by the European Union.149 Instead of coming head-to-head 
with European regulators, media companies that fear censorship should 
simply place their operations in jurisdictions that respect freedom of speech 
and expression. This type of tactic is entirely consistent with the European 
caselaw. 
Had the view of the French courts prevailed, the European right to be 
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forgotten could have de facto applied internationally and set a precedent 
that legal jurisdictions can control what is done outside of their borders. 
The European Court of Justice’s decision not to extend the right to delist to 
Google’s international sites provides for a stark imbalance in international 
law, not only between jurisdictions and continents, but between two 
different versions of the same website in the same place. But the results of 
the CNIL case point to a roadmap to bypass the right to be forgotten in the 
European Union by hosting the offending information elsewhere. 
It is instructive that in researching for this paper, details of the stories 
being removed were only available on websites of organizations in the 
United States, and not in Europe. The New York Times version of the “fish 
knife stabbing” story details that PrimaDaNoi, the Italian local news site 
founded in 2005, reported on the fight between two brothers in the 
restaurant business in 2008.150 The European sources did not have as many 
details. In the post-CNIL world, a multinational company can host content 
that would be removed in the European Union on the international or 
American versions of its website. Media companies that wish to be free 
from the European restrictions can create an international site, or perhaps 
share the information by syndication. 
Smaller media companies may not have the resources to create 
international versions. But they too can join together and create safe havens 
where information can be hosted outside of the European Union. The 
Offshore Journalism Project has an ongoing project to “maximize free 
speech by exploiting different jurisdictions.”151 This project takes 
inspiration from the pirate radio era. This project and others like it can 
provide a platform for those smaller media companies that do not have 
resources for a presence in the United States. The “offending” information 
can be hosted in a location outside the reach of the jurisdictions that would 
prohibit it, for example, by having a completely United States-based 
organization that would store all of the backed-up information. 
One key factor that would make these solutions feasible is that the 
right to be forgotten does not prohibit the publication of information (unless 
otherwise prohibited). Nor does the right to be forgotten kick in 
automatically. The subject has the right to request removal, and until the 
subject makes the request, the publication can host the information on its 
European site as well. This timeline would enable publications to back up 
all of their stories in the interim. 
The offshore solution would ensure that valuable information is not 
lost. It would also enable media companies and local publications to 
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comply with deletion requests while still maintaining their integrity, 
allowing them to live to fight another day. In order to make this solution 
truly viable, there would need to be significant cooperation among media 
and technology companies worldwide to create these options. 
While the stories themselves can be hosted in the United States safely, 
they will still not be visible from a Google search made from a version 
based in a European Union nation-state. There are, however, other search 
engines that do not tailor their searches by location.152 While the stories will 
be limited somewhat, they will not be entirely hidden from view. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The right to be forgotten in the European Union enables subjects to 
request the removal of information, news articles, and search engine results 
linking to this information. The subjects have this right even if the 
information had a newsworthy purpose, or indeed, even if the information 
is a legally mandated posting. While many cases are sympathetic, the broad 
right has the capacity for abuse and is a restriction on freedom of speech. It 
has the potential to cause serious harm to the free press in Europe. 
The right to be forgotten does have boundary limitations. The recent 
European Court of Justice case, Google v. CNIL, restricted the delisting 
obligation to the European Union and did not extend it to Google’s 
worldwide operations. In a global world and a global internet, this opens a 
window to using various jurisdictions to temper the dangers of unfettered 
press restrictions. 
Privacy rights in the United States do not allow for a right to be 
forgotten. The legal framework does not contain a broad data privacy 
regulatory framework which could include such a right. Courts have 
generally been skeptical of the kind of dignitary harms and retroactive 
action necessary for a right to be forgotten. This is seen in the secrecy 
paradigm, which allows for publication of personal information once it is 
no longer considered a secret, and in the truthfulness standard for 
defamation. A right to be forgotten would be at odds with the premium 
placed on freedom of speech in the United States. Publishers and search 
engines should utilize the legal framework that allows them to host 
information and search engines outside of the reach of the European Union. 
The United States is likely to stay free from a right to be forgotten for some 
time and can provide a safe haven for the information. 
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